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At the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-
Aligned Movement (nam) in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on 9 May 2012, 
the representatives of Papua New Guinea and Fiji introduced a resolu-
tion, which was approved and included in the meeting’s communiqué, 
stating that the organization, consisting of 120 member states, “affirmed 
the inalienable right of the people of French Polynesia–Ma‘ohi Nui to self-
determination in accordance with Chapter XI of the United Nations and 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)” (Fiji Ministry of Infor-
mation 2012).1 The same statement was reiterated at the Non-Aligned 
Movement summit in Tehran, Iran, held 26–31 August 2012 (nam 2012). 
Representing two-thirds of the UN member states, in the words of a Fijian 
journalist reporting on the issue, “The support by the 120 members of the 
movement will greatly assist the advancement of the issue in the United 
Nations” (Pratibha 2012). After an intensive lobbying campaign through-
out the rest of the year, a draft General Assembly resolution was released 
to the public by the French Polynesia president’s office on 31 January 
2013, officially published by the United Nations on 7 February, repub-
lished in an amended, streamlined version on 1 March, and passed by 
unanimous vote of the General Assembly—with France absent and a few 
other Western countries declaring their dissent—on 17 May (UN 2013).
The news from Egypt, Tehran, and New York, while received enthusi-
astically by French Polynesia’s pro-independence President Oscar Temaru 
and other proponents of Maohi (native Tahitian) nationalism, drew sharp 
criticism from the pro-French opposition parties. A 15 May 2012 press 
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statement of the Tahoeraa Huiraatira (People’s Rally) party of former 
President Gaston Flosse called the resolution of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment an “inacceptable interference in the internal affairs of France,” and 
in his own press statement the same day, Gaston Tong Sang, another for-
mer territorial president, affiliated with the major French right-wing party 
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, denied the legitimacy of Fiji’s and 
Papua New Guinea’s activism based on their governments’ poor demo-
cratic performance.
The controversy about the statements at the recent nam and UN meet-
ings is only the latest episode in a fierce debate about French Polynesia’s 
international status and its right to self-determination as a Non-Self-Gov-
erning Territory (nsgt). For the last six decades, the absence of French 
Polynesia from the United Nations list of nsgts dating from its unilat-
eral removal by France in 1947 has represented a great anomaly in the 
Pacific, as virtually all other dependent territories in the Pacific have been 
listed. On 18 August 2011, in a historic moment, the Assembly of French 
Polynesia voted to support the country’s reinscription as a nsgt, giving 
President Temaru for the first time a clear mandate to act toward that 
goal. Support for Temaru from independent Pacific Island governments in 
that sense had so far only been lukewarm but has significantly increased 
since the August 2011 assembly vote. On the other hand, both the French 
government and the pro-French opposition have constantly fought against 
Temaru’s campaign with a ferocity bordering on hysteria. Typically, in the 
French colonial or local pro-French discourse, events relating to the terri-
tory’s changes in political status in the 1940s and 1950s are represented 
inaccurately. 
For instance, in February 2008, the editor of a news magazine in Tahiti 
not only denounced President Temaru’s efforts to relist French Polynesia as 
a nsgt as a “paranoid attack against the [French] State” but also claimed 
in an article in the same issue that the 1956 French loi-cadre (“framework 
law” for the internal autonomy of French overseas territories) was “abol-
ished in Tahiti through the referendum of 1958.”2 As we will see in detail 
later in this article, it is completely inaccurate to claim that the French con-
stitutional referendum in 1958 caused or justified the abolition of internal 
autonomy in Tahiti, but this is often done in pro-French discourse in order 
to obscure what really went on during that time, which was nothing less 
than an arbitrary reassertion of French colonial authority, shutting down 
a process of decolonization that had already been initiated. 
At the other end of the spectrum, in 1998, popular Tahitian musician 
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and songwriter Angelo Ariitai Neuffer, famous for his political protest 
songs, released an album named Atire Atire (Enough, Enough!), which 
featured, among many songs denouncing French rule and the local pro-
French establishment in high poetic and musical quality, a piece titled 
“Hau Metua Roma” (Roman Mother Country) with the following lyrics:
E au te hau metua The mother country
Mai te hau Roma ra te huru  is like the Roman Empire 
O te aneti i te fenua Iseraela that annexed the country of Israel 
E au te hau metua The mother country
Mai te hau Roma ra te huru is like the Roman Empire
O te haavi i te nunaa Iseraela that enslaved the people of Israel
Noa atu ua pohe Heroda Even though Herod is dead
Area ra tana mau tamarii his children 
Te ora noa ra ratou i teie tau are still alive today
Noa atu ua pohe Ceisara Even though Caesar is dead
Area ra tana mau huaai  his descendants
Te faatiti noa ra ratou i teie tau continue to enslave people today
Hau metua Roma Roman mother country
Faahoi mai tau fenua give us back our land
Faahoi mai tau fenua give us back our land
Iseraela Maohi e our Maohi Israel3 
This song—shocking to many pro-French locals and the few French flu-
ent enough in Tahitian to understand it—can be interpreted at many levels. 
Very apparently, it represents a Christian millenarian vision for the future 
of the country, with the Maohi people identified as the people of Israel—
a recurrent topic in Tahitian nationalism that has been well researched 
by Tahiti-based French anthropologist Bruno Saura (1998, 2004) but is 
beyond the scope of this article. On a simpler level, the song uses an anal-
ogy of well-known New Testament history to denounce ongoing French 
colonialism in Tahiti as well as its local collaborators. Hau metua (parent 
government), a literal translation of the French terms métropole (from the 
Greek for “mother city”) or mère-patrie (mother country), is easily iden-
tifiable as a reference to the French government, and Caesar and Herod 
might be direct allusions to then French President Jacques Chirac and his 
close local ally, then French Polynesia President Gaston Flosse, or, alterna-
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tively, to 1960s President Charles de Gaulle and certain pro-French Tahi-
tian leaders of that period. 
Why would Neuffer say in his song that the French government is “mai 
te Hau Roma ra te huru” (like the Roman Empire), when many others, 
Tahitians and French, consider relations between French Polynesia and 
France to be cordial and the current political situation of the country as 
an autonomous territory within the French Republic a satisfying arrange-
ment? And why do Oscar Temaru and several other politicians today 
insist that their country is a French colony in need of decolonization? In 
this article I argue that despite passionate arguments to the contrary, in 
French Polynesia, colonialism is not an issue of the past. 
I begin by recounting the political history of the country since the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century, arguing that mutually interconnected 
acts of colonialism by the French State in the late 1950s and 1960s con-
stituted acts of virtual recolonization that have traumatized French Poly-
nesian society to this day, continued by a colonial policy of manipulating 
local politics and arbitrarily changing the rules to support political leaders 
favorable to French interests. 
The Trauma of “Recolonization”: Pouvanaa a Oopa  
and the Centre d’Experimentations du Pacifique
By the time of World War II, the core islands of the Etablissements Fran-
çais de l’Océanie (efo, French Establishments of Oceania), as the terri-
tory was then called, had been under French rule for roughly a century. 
Comprising about 120 islands in the central eastern Pacific, spread over 
a vast maritime area comparable in size to central Europe, the territory 
is made up of six archipelagoes: the Windward Islands (Nia Matai); Lee-
ward Islands (Raro Matai); Austral Islands (Tuhaa Pae); Tuamotu Islands; 
Gambier Islands (Mangareva); and Marquesas Islands (Henua Enana or 
Fenua Enata) (see map 1). The main island of Tahiti in the Windward 
Islands, with the capital Papeete, unified as an independent kingdom 
under the Pomare dynasty since 1815, was placed under a forced French 
protectorate in 1842 and remained so until 1880 when it was formally 
annexed as a French colony. The various outer islands, some of which 
had formed their own native kingdoms, were subsequently annexed and 
incorporated into the efo between 1880 and 1901. 
On most islands, the process of colonization was not at all a smooth 
affair. Usually, if interested in taking an island, France first tried to obtain 
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the consent of the native government or tribal leaders for the acquisition 
of their territory, but the French ultimately enforced their intentions with 
the threat or use of violence. French historian Pierre-Yves Toullelan wrote 
in 1991, “[French] Polynesia did not give itself to France but had to be 
conquered by the force of arms.”4 In cases where relatively strong native 
states existed, France’s strategy was to first establish a protectorate, then 
subvert and undermine the local government within that protectorate, and 
finally get it annexed—if possible by consent, if not by force. 
After the submission of the last movements of armed resistance in the 
Leeward Islands in the late 1890s, there was no visible political move-
ment in the efo for several decades. Some instances of political resistance 
occurred in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but the first true twentieth-
century nationalist movement was led by Pouvanaa a Oopa after World 
War II. Born on Huahine in the Leeward Islands in 1895, only a few 
months before the island submitted to French rule, Pouvanaa fought as 
a volunteer for the French army in World War I and declared himself in 
favor of the pro–allied French exile government under General Charles de 
Gaulle during World War II. At the same time, Pouvanaa protested against 
injustices of the colonial system and was arrested and jailed several times, 
which made him quickly popular among the rural and working-class pop-
ulation (Regnault 1996, 51–53; Saura 1997, 113–195).
After Paris conferred French citizenship on all native inhabitants of the 
efo in 1945 and the status of all French colonies was changed to that 
of territoires d’outre-mer (overseas territories), the efo were granted a 
democratically elected representative assembly for the first time, while the 
territory also received representation in the French parliament—one mem-
ber in the National Assembly and one in the Senate. However, executive 
power remained firmly in the hand of the Paris-appointed governor, who 
kept all the prerogatives outlined in an 1885 decree (Regnault 1996, 36; 
Gille 2006, 55, 85–87). 
This new framework of electoral democracy made it possible for Pou-
vanaa to organize his growing support into a political party, founded in 
1947 and called Rassemblement Démocratique des Populations Tahi-
tiennes (rdpt, Democratic Rally of the Tahitian Populations) in 1949. 
With his popularity steadily increasing through his leadership of further 
protests against ongoing injustices, Pouvanaa was elected member of the 
French National Assembly in October 1949. As rdpt was one of the first 
anticolonial parties in the Pacific, its ideology contained strong social-
ist and nationalist elements, and throughout the 1950s, it dominated the 
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political scene in the territory, constantly winning large majorities at all 
elections (Regnault 1996; Dorrance 1966, 82–83; Tagupa 1976, 5–8). 
With similar movements dominating the assemblies of most of its ter-
ritories, France eventually gave in to some of their demands and in 1956 
enacted the so-called loi-cadre (framework law), which provided a frame-
work for limited self-government in all overseas territories.5 For the first 
time, executive power was partially exercised by an elected body, as under 
the new statute, the assembly elected a government council, composed of 
six to eight ministers, which was presided over by the governor but had an 
elected vice president who acted as a sort of chief minister. Key aspects of 
sovereignty such as foreign affairs, internal security, and justice remained 
the exclusive responsibility of the governor, but most local service agen-
cies were placed under the territorial government, each headed by one 
of the ministers. The assembly received quasi-legislative powers in these 
areas. Unsurprisingly, Pouvanaa was elected to the post of vice president 
in December 1957. While leading the territorial government, members of 
his party contemplated the formation of a “Tahitian Republic” within the 
French Union as the next step in the process of decolonization. However, 
local business interests vigorously opposed the new government’s policy 
for more social equality, which led to increasing political and social ten-
sions during 1958 and eventually to a split of the governing party between 
Pouvanaa and his lieutenant, Jean-Baptiste Heitarauri Céran-Jérusalémy 
(Gille 2006, 88–92; Regnault 1996; see Céran-Jérusalémy 2001 for an 
autobiographical account).
In mid-1958, however, there were drastic changes in France, as General 
Charles de Gaulle rose to power and a new constitution was drafted for 
the Fifth Republic. The new framework for the republic’s overseas posses-
sions became the Communauté Française (French Community), consisting 
of metropolitan France, the overseas territories, and autonomous member 
states associated with France (Government of France 1958, section XII, 
article 77-87). A national referendum on the constitution was held on 
28 September 1958 and included all overseas territories. Pouvanaa cam-
paigned for a “no” vote, which was understood to lead to immediate inde-
pendence, whereas Céran-Jérusalémy joined the business establishment in 
their campaign for “yes.” The French administration aided the proponents 
of “yes” and hindered the campaign of Pouvanaa, who was denied access 
to radio and to transportation to outer islands. Some of his campaign 
activists were detained without charges. Under these conditions, the “yes” 
campaign was unsurprisingly successful in French Polynesia, but neverthe-
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less the proportion of “yes” votes at 64.42 percent was rather moderate. 
In most other French territories, over 90 percent voted “yes” (Dorrance 
1966, 46–48; Toullelan and Gille 1994, 142; Regnault 1996, 174–183).
Shortly after the referendum, tensions between pro- and anti-French 
Tahitians rose, and some acts of violence took place. On 8 October, the 
governor suspended the government council, and on 11 October, Pouva-
naa was arrested, in spite of his parliamentary immunity as a National 
Assembly member. He was later sentenced to eight years of imprisonment 
and fifteen years of banishment in France for complicity in attempted 
arson. In a speech, he had quoted the Bible about the destruction and 
reconstruction of the temple of Jerusalem, which was construed as a call 
to burn down Papeete (Saura 1997, 351–352). Contemporary observers 
generally assumed that the trial was a farce (Ilari 1965, 301; Dorrance 
1966, 52–53)6—an assumption reinforced by the fact that, around the 
same time, a local pro-French politician who had distributed a pamphlet 
calling very unambiguously for physical violence against Pouvanaa was 
not even charged.7
After Pouvanaa’s arrest, under pressure and in fear, the assembly voted 
to dismiss the government council, which was implemented by decree in 
October 1958. According to article 16 of the 1958 constitution, the assem-
bly of each overseas territory that had voted “yes” in the referendum had 
to choose between three options: retain the status quo, go for départemen-
talisation (ie, become an administrative division of metropolitan France), 
or become a member state in the Communauté. While most overseas ter-
ritories chose the third option, the assembly of French Polynesia voted on 
14 November 1958 to remain an overseas territory. It also voted to strip 
the local government council of most of its powers. In an executive order 
of 23 December 1958, the institutions of the loi-cadre were virtually abol-
ished. Under the new statute, the government council was presided over 
by the governor or his secretary, and its members, proportionally elected 
by the assembly, no longer had ministerial responsibilities. In fact, the gov-
ernor became once more the all-powerful head of the territorial adminis-
tration, and the incipient process of devolution was virtually terminated 
(Dorrance 1966, 55; Regnault 1996, 186–188). 
When leading members of Pouvanaa’s party later attempted to revise the 
decision of the assembly of November 1958 and obtain a status of associ-
ated state in the Communauté for the territory in 1963, this was refused, 
and both factions of the rdpt were “dissolved”—that is, banned—by 
executive decree in 1963 for advocating the dismemberment of the “terri-
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torial integrity” of France (Dorrance 1966, 70–72; Tagupa 1976, 16; Reg-
nault 1996, 192–194). Apparently the territory was now suddenly seen as 
an integral part of France, even though the constitution, in article 74-76, 
did not clearly and unambiguously define overseas territories as such.
The reason for this anachronistic tightening of colonial authority dur-
ing an era of global decolonization became clear a few years later when 
in 1961–62 the French government under President de Gaulle decided 
to establish in the territory a nuclear weapons testing center, the Centre 
d’Experimentations du Pacifique, which was officially announced in early 
1963. Despite the resistance of some leading local politicians, the program 
was implemented, and the first test was conducted on the atoll of Moru-
roa in the Tuamotu Archipelago in 1966.8 For the following decades, the 
political and economic life of French Polynesia was dominated by the 
French military, and any moves toward local self-government were sup-
pressed. Not only did the tests cause irradiation, but the militarization of 
the territory also led to a massive social and economic upheaval through 
the influx of great numbers of military and civilian personnel and massive 
amounts of money (Danielsson and Danielsson 1986, 1993). 
Tahiti-based French historian Jean-Marc Regnault has found ample 
evidence that the conviction and banishment of Pouvanaa was indeed 
a scheme of the French government because of the territory’s strategic 
importance (Regnault 2003a, 77–136; 2003b).9 For instance, then French 
Minister of Justice Edmond Michelet complained to the minister of over-
seas territories about the irregularities in the arrest and trial of Pouvanaa, 
including the fact that the judicial docket file for the case was empty, but 
his complaint was never followed up, apparently for reasons of “national 
interest” (Regnault 2011a). For the same reason, pressure was put on the 
territorial assembly to vote to maintain overseas territory status and get 
rid of the loi-cadre institutions (Regnault 1996, 201–204). In a telegram 
on 15 September 1958, a few days before the referendum, the French min-
ister of overseas territories advised the governor of French Polynesia, “It 
should be well understood that French Polynesia must ask for the status of 
overseas territory and not for that of member of the Community.”10 From 
the point of view of the French government, it was thus never contem-
plated that the territory should freely determine its own status, not even 
within the framework of the Communauté Française, but merely that its 
voters and its assembly give a façade of democracy to a decision already 
made in Paris. 
The disastrous long-term impacts of three decades of nuclear testing (46 
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atmospheric explosions between 1966 and 1973 and 147 underground 
explosions between 1974 and 1996) on the environment, health, and 
economy of the territory, the details of which are beyond the purview of 
this article, have been well documented in various independent studies 
(Danielsson and Danielsson 1986, 1993; de Vries and Seur 1997; Barillot 
2002) and most recently by a special inquiry committee of the French 
Polynesia assembly (apf 2006). However, so far, the French government 
has not officially admitted to having caused these impacts, let alone apolo-
gized for them. Until 2006, the French government policy was to claim 
that the nuclear tests were entirely “safe,” and while in 2010 the French 
parliament enacted a law that in principle enables victims of irradiation 
to make claims for compensation, the law in its current version has too 
many flaws to make it effective, as I have described elsewhere (Gonschor 
2010, 176–177; 2011, 221; 2012, 181; see also Al Wardi and Regnault 
2011, 103–105).
French government responses to the injustice of the Pouvanaa sham 
trial have been largely similar to those to nuclear testing—namely, turning 
a deaf ear on the affair. After the assembly of French Polynesia repeatedly 
voted to demand a retrial, and Richard Ariihau Tuheiava, currently one 
of the two senators representing French Polynesia in the French senate, 
had reiterated these demands (Regnault 2011a), a review of the trial was 
initiated in April 2013. The very fact that the affair has to be treated like 
a regular criminal trial, rather than simply declared a politically motivated 
show trial and therefore null and void (as other abusive judicial decisions 
of authoritarian regimes have been), attests either to an obvious will to 
conceal the arbitrary nature of colonial justice or to great naïveté about it. 
But the continuing denial of colonial history and the outright mock-
ery of its victims by the French government also manifests itself on the 
symbolic level. On 28 June 2006, President Temaru’s cabinet decided to 
rename the main street in the administrative district of Papeete “Aroa Nui 
Pouvanaa a Oopa” (Pouvanaa a Oopa Avenue). Previously, it had been 
known as Bruat Avenue, after Armand-Joseph Bruat, the first French colo-
nial governor in the 1840s. A few days later, Temaru inaugurated a monu-
ment to the victims of French nuclear testing in a beachfront park to mark 
the fortieth anniversary of the first nuclear test on Moruroa. Instead of 
supporting these symbolic acts as a gesture of reconciliation, French High 
Commissioner Anne Boquet denounced both the monument and the street 
renaming as “unfriendly gestures” toward France, implying that only con-
tinuing to ostracize Pouvanaa’s memory and denying the damages caused 
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by nuclear testing would be “friendly” policies (TP, 30 June, 2 July, 3 July 
2006).11 
Anomalies of Decolonization, International  
and Domestic
The arrest and imprisonment of Pouvanaa, the abolition of loi-cadre self-
government, and the imposition of the Centre d’Experimentations du 
Pacifique in French Polynesia were not simply arbitrary acts of an authori-
tarian colonial government. What makes them so troublesome is that they 
happened during a time when Western colonies were achieving indepen-
dence in Asia and Africa; even in the neighboring insular Pacific territo-
ries, the process of decolonization was beginning to unfold, with West ern 
Samoa becoming the first to gain independence in 1962 (Naidu 1993, 
129–130).12 From a more legalistic point of view, the policy pursued in 
French Polynesia also represents a great anomaly in terms of the decoloni-
zation process institutionalized by the United Nations, as well as in terms 
of the French domestic decolonization process.
Before returning to the specific case of the efo/French Polynesia, let 
us briefly recall the history of the UN decolonization regime. The Char-
ter of the United Nations, enacted in June 1945, contains in chapter XI 
a “declaration regarding non-self-governing territories,” which stipulates 
that members in possession of “territories whose people have not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government” should recognize the interests 
of their people as paramount. The administering powers were furthermore 
instructed to develop self-government; to promote economic, social, and 
educational advancement in these territories; and, in article 73e, to trans-
mit regularly information on the progress of these developments to the 
secretary-general of the United Nations. Sovereignty of colonial powers 
over their colonial territories was thus for the first time limited (Ahmad 
1974, 9–10, 372–374). However, the wording was still weak and ambigu-
ous, mentioning only “self-government” and not necessarily independence 
as the goal of the political evolution of the territories. One year later, the 
UN General Assembly passed resolution 66 (I) of December 1946, laying a 
foundation for dealings with the territories referred to in chapter XI of the 
charter. The resolution established a list of seventy-four territories about 
which information was to be transmitted by the administrative powers 
according to article 73e, as well as a committee to collect that information 
(UN 1946). 
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However, the defining characteristics of nsgts remained ambiguous 
and became an issue of contention among UN member states. In reaction, 
the General Assembly passed several resolutions throughout the 1940s 
and 1950s to define nsgts and the responsibilities of administering pow-
ers more clearly (Ahmad 1974, 170, 183, 188–263, 283–286, 390). The 
systematization of the legal framework for decolonization culminated in 
1960. After a large number of former dependent territories in Africa had 
become independent countries and joined the United Nations, the General 
Assembly became predominantly anticolonial and subsequently passed 
the “Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries 
and peoples” as resolution 1514 (XV) in December of 1960. This dec-
laration clearly and unambiguously called for the decolonization of the 
remaining nsgts, stating: 
1.  The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is 
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment 
to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.
2.  All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that 
right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic social and political development.
3.  Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational prepared-
ness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. (UN 
1960a, article 1-3)
To complement these powerful words with practical definitions, the 
UN General Assembly passed resolution 1541 (XV), which defined more 
clearly than ever before the criteria for a territory to be listed as non-self-
governing, as well as the conditions for such a territory to be regarded as 
decolonized. A full measure of self-government can be reached in three 
ways, after which there is no longer an obligation to transmit information: 
“(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with 
an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State” (UN 
1960b).
Following World War II, France promised in the preamble to its 1946 
constitution to grant its colonies self-government. In wording that clearly 
reflected article 73 of the UN charter, the preamble stated: 
Faithful to its traditional mission, France intends to conduct the peoples of 
which she has taken care to the liberty of governing themselves and manag-
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ing democratically their own affairs; ruling out any system of colonization 
founded on arbitrariness, she guarantees to all equal access to public functions 
and individual or collective exercise of rights and liberties hereafter proclaimed 
or confirmed. (Government of France 1946)13
Following these ideals in its constitution, France listed almost all of 
its overseas possessions as nsgts. The efo thus figured on the 1946 list 
among those territories about which France transmitted information to 
the United Nations (UN 1946). However, only one year later, in 1947, 
France stopped transmitting information on the territory, effectively 
removing it from the list, together with New Caledonia, Saint-Pierre and 
Miquelon, and the French Establishments of India,14 while information 
continued to be transmitted on the other French territories. Initially, no 
official explanation was given for this selective removal (Ahmad 1974, 
183). In a 1949 statement, France declared the definition of nsgts to be 
a matter of exclusive national competence, despite the passage of a UN 
resolution stating the contrary (El-Ayouty 1971, 152; Ahmad 1974, 179, 
187, 190). One year earlier, in 1948, but still a year after the unilateral 
removal, the granting of “extensive political rights” and a regime “closely 
resembling . . . that of Metropolitan France” had been given as a justifica-
tion for the removal of the efo (UN General Assembly report, third ses-
sion, quoted in Ahmad 1974, 190–191). The first explanation might refer 
to the granting of French citizenship to all inhabitants of the efo in 1945, 
whereas the second is not very convincing at all, as the political organiza-
tion in the efo after 1945, as described above, remained vastly different 
from and certainly less democratic than that of metropolitan France (Reg-
nault 2006, 55). 
The removal of both the French Establishments in Oceania and New 
Caledonia from the list in 1947 was thus clearly arbitrary. For New Cale-
donia, this unjust situation was eventually corrected through a reinscrip-
tion process in 1986 (UN 1986), but the French Polynesia case remained 
unresolved until 2013.15 After removing it from the list, France attempted 
to minimize the international engagement of the territory. This was shown 
very bluntly in Fiji in 1950 at the first South Pacific Conference, a meeting 
organized by the colonial powers to promote the development of Pacific 
Island territories, in which most of the leading native politicians of the 
Pacific participated. At this conference, French Oceania was the only ter-
ritory represented not by an Islander but by a European (Fry 1997, 186). 
This appears totally illogical, especially as the territory was by then one 
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of the most politically developed in the Pacific, and National Assembly 
Member Pouvanaa a Oopa or another rdpt leader would have been its 
obvious representative. It thus seems likely that France deliberately tried 
to keep local politicians unaware of political developments in the region.
Even though United Nations involvement with the efo ended with the 
withdrawal from the list in 1947, decolonization efforts continued both 
within the territory and in the larger French system. In the referendum on 
the new French constitution in September 1958, a large majority in all 
overseas territories voted “yes,” except for Guinea, which voted “no,” 
resulting in immediate independence.16 Most other territories then voted 
to become member states of the French Community, a type of freely asso-
ciated status. Two years later the French Community was dissolved and 
all its member states became fully independent by mutual consent in 1960 
(Yacono 1971, 91–101). Looking back at the 1958 events in Tahiti, the 
position of Céran-Jérusalémy, advocating a Tahitian republic but voting 
“yes” in the referendum, was probably a more reasonable strategy for the 
eventual achievement of independence than Pouvanaa’s campaign for a 
“no” vote, in other words advocating an immediate break-off indepen-
dence like Guinea (Henningham 1992, 124). The assertion that the 1958 
“yes” vote was a vote against independence and for remaining a French 
territory forever, as has been repeatedly claimed by the French govern-
ment (Tagupa 1976, 19; Danielsson and Danielsson 1986, 119), is thus 
fundamentally wrong. In fact, voting “yes” meant only the rejection of 
immediate independence and the willingness to cooperate with France in a 
continuing decolonization process. Had France not arbitrarily intervened 
in the aftermath of the referendum, French Polynesia would likely have 
followed the model of the African territories in becoming a member state 
of the French Community and achieving independence in 1960 (Regnault 
2011c).
But the list of chances for decolonization goes on. Besides French Poly-
nesia, there were only three other territories with native populations 
whose assemblies voted to retain overseas territory status after the 1958 
referendum, namely New Caledonia, the Comoro Islands, and French 
Somali land (now known as Djibouti) (Yacono 1971, 91). Strangely 
enough, of these four, three retained the loi-cadre institutions of an elected 
council of ministers and a vice president, whereas in French Polynesia 
these institutions were removed and an authoritarian governor-centered 
administrative system of pre–loi-cadre times restored. Eventually a similar 
curtailing happened in New Caledonia in 1963 (Lenormand 1991, 143; 
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Regnault 2003a, 135), but the other two territories, the Comoros and 
French Somaliland, retained their vice presidents and local governments. 
As independence movements were on the rise in the latter two territories, 
both eventually received a status of internal autonomy, and under pressure 
from the neighboring newly independent African states, both territories 
were later also reinscribed on the UN list of nsgts (UN 1966, 1973); they 
eventually achieved independence in 1975 and 1977, respectively.17 Dur-
ing the same time, French Polynesia and New Caledonia remained under 
an authoritarian system of government without any locally elected chief 
executive. 
With this calculated denial of self-determination, both French Pacific 
territories thus clearly represent anomalies, not only under international 
law but also within the larger picture of French domestic decoloniza-
tion.18 In French Polynesia’s case, that denial from 1958 onward could 
be readily understood as motivated by military considerations concern-
ing the planned nuclear testing center (Regnault 1996, 197–204; 2003a, 
119–135; 2006, 217). However, it is not entirely clear why this systematic 
denial of decolonization and arbitrary distinction from other territories 
dates back to 1947, a time when France had no major military installa-
tions there. The most likely explanation is that France planned from very 
early on that in case it had to grant most of its territories independence, it 
would keep some small insular remnants of its empire—which allowed, at 
a comparatively low cost overall, the maintaining of a worldwide chain of 
military bases, and thus enabled France to remain a global power.19 
The Concept of Autonomy: Merits and Excesses 
Despite the repression and dismantling of local self-government in 
1958–1963 as related earlier, French Polynesia today ostensibly enjoys 
once more a great degree of self-government under a system of so-called 
“autonomy,” which was recently brought forward by French Minister of 
Overseas Territories Marie-Luce Penchard as an argument for why rein-
scription as a nsgt was not necessary (TP, 19 Aug 2011). An assessment 
of the validity of that argument thus warrants a closer examination of the 
particular status of autonomy and its history in French Polynesia. As inter-
national law scholar Maivân Lâm defined it, “Autonomy” can be defined 
as a “political term to designate domestic devolutions of power to substate 
groups” (2000, 140), thus representing a progressive step within a decol-
onization process, empowering the local population in its relation with 
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the ruling power, and furthering the development of political leadership. 
Autonomy is therefore a good first step in the process of decolonization. 
In Where Nation-States Come From, American political scientist Philip 
Roeder pointed to the role of segment-states—that is, autonomous state-
like entities within sovereign states—as the core institutions on which new 
nation-states can be built, the independence of which should above all 
be understood as an “administrative upgrade of an existing jurisdiction” 
(2007, 10). Looking at the recent history of the region, one notes that all 
Pacific Island territories that later became independent went through a 
preparatory period of territorial autonomy for several years before achiev-
ing independence, each of them a good case to confirm Roeder’s “seg-
ment-state” thesis.20 
Among the French overseas territories, the concept of autonomy was 
first applied through the enactment of a statute of internal autonomy for 
the Comoros Islands in 1961, later followed by a similar statute for the 
Djibouti territory (then called the French Afar and Issa Territory) in 1967. 
Both territories were governed under this system, with a territorial govern-
ment headed by an indirectly elected president, until their independence 
(Tagupa 1976, 19; Ibrahime 2000, 81–82; Thompson and Adloff 1968, 
99–101).
While the Comoros and Djibouti enjoyed these autonomy statutes, 
and eventually achieved independence, the French Pacific territories were 
run by an authoritarian governor and had virtually no autonomy at all, 
since even the loi-cadre institutions had for the most part been abolished, 
as explained earlier. This inconsistent and unjust situation was strongly 
denounced by the leading politicians of the two Pacific territories through-
out the late 1960s and early 1970s, but to no avail in Paris. Through-
out the 1970s, an increasingly assertive autonomist movement under 
National Assembly Member Francis Ariioehau Sanford, then a follower of 
Pouva naa, continued its efforts to obtain internal autonomy, which San-
ford described as a way of “decolonizing without ceasing to be French” 
(Haupert 1998, 18), though he also threatened to turn toward indepen-
dence if no autonomy was given and underlined the campaign with acts of 
civil disobedience (Tagupa 1976, 18–21). 
Under this enormous popular pressure, the French government even-
tually gave in, and in July 1977 it reorganized the political institutions 
of the territory, creating a system similar to the loi-cadre institutions of 
1957–58, commonly referred to as autonomie de gestion (autonomy of 
management), with a territorial government council led by an elected 
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vice president, a position first taken by Francis Sanford, then from 1982 
by his pro-French opponent Gaston Flosse. The territorial government 
became responsible for all fields of governance not specifically attributed 
to the French State, which, however, were still many, including not only 
defense and foreign affairs but also many internal affairs. The governor 
was renamed high commissioner and the decree of 1885 that defined the 
nearly absolute powers of his position was finally abolished, although he 
remained the formal head of the territorial administration (Gille 2006, 
96–101).
Administrative reforms undertaken in 1982 by Socialist French Presi-
dent Mitterrand in metropolitan France set the stage for further devolu-
tion of the territory’s powers in September 1984 under a statute of “inter-
nal autonomy,” essentially similar in extent to the former statutes of the 
Comoros and Djibouti. The French State and the territorial administra-
tions became fully separated, the former being headed by the high com-
missioner, the latter by a president elected by the assembly. Additionally, 
the territory was allowed to adopt its own state-like symbols (flag, coat of 
arms, and anthem), and its prerogatives were further extended, including 
participation in foreign affairs if they concerned neighboring Pacific Island 
countries (Gille 2006, 102–114). 
In August 1995, the French constitution was revised, deleting the provi-
sion in article 1 referring to the “peoples of the Overseas Territories” and 
all articles referring to member states of the French Community (which 
had de facto ceased to exist in 1960) (Government of France 1995). While 
the overall position of overseas territories was thus significantly weakened, 
in April 1996, after the definitive closure of the nuclear testing center, a 
new statute for French Polynesia was passed, once more increasing the 
responsibilities of the territorial government. While President Flosse soon 
demanded another revision to achieve even more power for the territory, 
the local opposition began criticizing the concept of increased autonomy as 
a cover for authoritarian rule by Flosse.21 Indeed, as Tahiti-based political 
scientist Sémir Al Wardi described in the aptly titled 2008 book Tahiti Nui 
ou les dérives de l’autonomie (Tahiti Nui or the Excesses of Autonomy), 
during the 1990s and early 2000s, with the blessing of the French govern-
ment, Gaston Flosse was able to construct a sort of authoritarian patron-
age regime not unlike those in many independent postcolonial states and 
use the concept of autonomy to shield this regime from the scrutiny of 
French legal and political standards (Al Wardi 2008, 109–161). 
In March 2003, with Gaston Flosse at the peak of his power and his 
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supporters enjoying a great majority at the national level, the French gov-
ernment undertook another major revision of its constitution with regard 
to overseas possessions. The category of territoire d’outre-mer (overseas 
territory) was abolished, replaced by that of collectivité d’outre-mer (over-
seas collectivity), each of which would be governed by a proper organic 
law reflecting its local specificities, with a considerably extended range of 
possible powers to be devolved to them (Government of France 2003). 
Following that enlarged constitutional framework, a new organic law 
for French Polynesia was elaborated and passed in February 2004 (Gov-
ernment of France 2004). The former overseas territory was now defined 
as a pays d’outre-mer (overseas country), and its prerogatives became 
once more substantially extended. Besides an increase of responsibilities 
in administrative matters, French Polynesia now can, if permitted by the 
French government, enter into its own relations with foreign governments 
and establish representations there. The territory can also become a mem-
ber or observer of international organizations—which it subsequently did 
when it became first an observer and then an associate member of the 
Pacific Islands Forum in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Locally, the powers 
of the assembly were significantly increased, as it can now enact so-called 
lois du pays (laws of the country) in certain domains, which have stand-
ing almost equal but still inferior to French national laws. Previously the 
assembly could only enact déliberations (resolutions) without formal legal 
standing. 
While the 2004 statute was lauded by its proponents as the ultimate 
extension of local self-government within French sovereignty, the local 
opposition saw it as further empowerment for authoritarian rule by Flosse, 
blessed by his supporters in Paris, especially since the electoral system was 
modified to include a majority bonus system so that the leading political 
party would receive an overwhelming majority in the assembly.22 This view 
was ultimately supported by a large part of the population, and Flosse’s 
party lost power in the first election under the new statute and was suc-
ceeded by hitherto opposition leader Oscar Temaru. Temaru’s party, Tavini 
Huiraarira No Te Ao Maohi (Serving the People of the Maohi World), 
was founded in 1977 as one of many splinter groups demanding outright 
independence (in contrast to the moderate pro-autonomy nationalists like 
Sanford), but over the course of three decades, Temaru had succeeded 
in virtually monopolizing the pro-independence vote and his party had 
become the leading force in opposition to Flosse (Regnault 2004, 67–76). 
Due partly to corruption and opportunist patterns of behavior of many 
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assembly members (including many of Temaru’s followers as well), but 
also due to major interventions by the French government described later 
in this article, great instability has followed and majorities have changed 
frequently since the 2004 election, with Temaru, Flosse, and former Flosse 
ally Gaston Tong Sang repeatedly winning the presidency and then losing 
it through no-confidence motions.23 
Having proven unable to create political stability, the pays d’outre-mer 
statute has also not guaranteed real local self-government. Despite all the 
powers granted to the local government, France remains able to make 
arbitrary modifications to the territory’s political system, even against the 
explicit will of the local assembly. This was exemplified in the fall of 2007, 
when a revision of the 2004 statute, including another reform of the elec-
tion system and a tightening of French government controls over the exer-
cise of power by the local institutions (Government of France 2007), was 
rushed through the French parliament and passed, despite the fact that a 
two-thirds majority of the assembly of French Polynesia had previously 
voted against that modification (TP, 4 Oct 2007).
In contrast, the current political status of New Caledonia provides an 
example of genuine autonomy within the French system. It is based on 
the 1998 Noumea Accord between the Kanak Independence movement, 
pro-French settlers, and the French government, which recognizes the 
ramifications of colonialism in its preamble and provides for a period 
of increased autonomy for twenty years before a referendum in which 
the people will decide whether to remain an autonomous territory under 
French sovereignty or to become independent.24 In order to implement 
the accord, the French constitution was amended with a specific article 
on New Caledonia. The autonomy thereby granted to New Caledonia is 
far more secure than even the 2004 version of autonomy for French Poly-
nesia. Whereas the latter represents a simple organic law enacted through 
parliamentary vote by metropolitan authorities, the former was enacted 
in reflection of an accord signed after trilateral negotiations. Further-
more, the constitutional amendment allows New Caledonia to have its 
own citizenship, restricted to inhabitants of a certain length of residence, 
so that a further dilution of the local population through French immi-
gration is blocked. In addition, the New Caledonia statute provides for 
an executive government composed proportionally of all major parties 
represented in the legislative body, thus avoiding political instability due 
to unclear majorities.25 It also decentralizes power within New Caledo-
nia by dividing the territory into three autonomous provinces—another 
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contrast with French Polynesia, the government of which is completely 
centralized in Papeete, despite significant differences between the five 
archipelagoes, both ethnolinguistically and in their political history and 
attitudes toward France. Finally, any transfer of responsibilities from the 
French state to New Caledonia is by definition irreversible, which makes 
arbitrary modifications, such as that of December 2007 for French Poly-
nesia, impossible.26 
Interestingly enough, the Noumea Accord was enacted several years 
after New Caledonia’s reinscription as a nsgt, and one should wonder 
whether the accord would ever have come into being if the territory had 
not been under the watch of the United Nations. Minister Penchard’s 
argument that French Polynesia’s statute of autonomy makes reinscription 
unnecessary is thus rather illogical, inverting causes and effects. Rather 
than being used as a reason for removal from the list, autonomy is usually 
granted to listed nsgts as part of a self-determination process. Virtually 
all nsgts that are still on the UN list today enjoy a degree of territorial 
autonomy, some of them as high as or even higher than that of French 
Polynesia, but in none of them has that granting of autonomy been recog-
nized as a reason for delisting.27 
Autonomy can thus only be a transition toward, not an alternative to, 
decolonization. There is no doubt that the statutes of autonomy have had 
a far-reaching effect on the political scene of the territory, as all politi-
cians in French Polynesia now accept autonomy (some seeing it as an end 
goal, others as a step toward independence) and reclaim the political heri-
tage of Pouvanaa, while there are no longer supporters of direct colonial 
rule (Saura 1997, 441). However, despite the existence of even the most 
far-reaching statute of autonomy, sovereignty—that is, the “authority to 
allocate and reallocate all decision rights within [the territory’s] borders” 
(Roeder 2007, 63)—remains with the French government, which has con-
stantly meddled in the territory’s affairs, even those purportedly relin-
quished to local control. 
“Unfinished Electoral Processes” and “Red Lines”: 
Colonial Interference Continues 
The unilateral revision of French Polynesia’s organic law by the French 
parliament in 2007 was only one of the latest instances of interference by 
the French government into the local political process. Throughout his 
rule, Gaston Flosse and his supporters were virtually free to do as they 
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pleased, even if their actions violated applicable French law (Al Wardi 
2008, 167–169, 181–182). At the same time, pro-independence and anti-
nuclear activists were subject to monitoring, harassment, and sometimes 
severe mistreatment by French security agencies.28 When Oscar Temaru’s 
coalition won the 2004 elections but held only a precarious majority, the 
French government started a vigorous campaign to obstruct the formation 
of a new government under Temaru and to bring Flosse back into power. 
When the results were announced, Flosse himself admitted to his defeat 
and suggested that “logically, Oscar Temaru should take my place.”29 But 
a few hours later French Minister of Overseas Territories Brigitte Girardin 
stated in the National Assembly that “the electoral process [was] far from 
over,”30 causing widespread consternation and insecurity among Temaru 
and his supporters. Girardin personally made a telephone call to Philip 
Schyle, leader of a minor party then negotiating a coalition agreement 
with Temaru, urging him to enter in a coalition agreement with Flosse 
instead (Al Wardi 2008, 172). Throughout the rest of 2004, the French 
government, through Minister Girardin and High Commissioner Michel 
Matthieu, put in place a vast scheme to undermine the Temaru govern-
ment and put Flosse back in power. These efforts finally succeeded in 
November 2004 despite unprecedented protests by tens of thousands and 
continued even after Temaru regained his majority in a by-election in early 
2005.31 Fittingly, Regnault spoke of “colonial practices in favor of a clan” 
(2004, 121).32
While the personal friendship between Jacques Chirac and Gaston 
Flosse might be seen as a specific reason for the efforts taken by Chirac’s 
government to keep his friend in power, a similar policy of colonial inter-
vention continued under Chirac’s successor Nicolas Sarkozy, in office 
from 2007 to 2012. Under Sarkozy’s presidency, the local political scene 
underwent a dramatic reconfiguration. Following a major disagreement 
between Gaston Flosse and his former lieutenant, Gaston Tong Sang, the 
latter left the Tahoeraa Huiraatira to form his own party, while Flosse, 
no longer favored by Paris, made a 180-degree turn and entered a politi-
cal alliance with his former archenemy, Temaru. In a July 2007 memo-
randum of agreement, Flosse and Temaru agreed to respect their diverg-
ing political convictions while working together in the interest of the 
country, intending to develop something akin to the New Caledonian 
model (DT, 20 July 2007; NT, 21 July 2007). Flosse’s subsequent embrace 
of anticolonial nationalism went so far as to publicly denounce France 
for its nuclear tests (Flosse 2009) and to lay a wreath for fallen Tahitian 
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soldiers who had fought against French colonization in the 1800s (TP, 30 
June 2008). 
Confronted with the prospect of a possibly stable broad majority hos-
tile to French colonial interests, Sarkozy’s secretary of state (downgraded 
from a minister) for overseas territories, Christian Estrosi, departed on 
another campaign of massive interference in the local political process, 
now with the goal to boost Tong Sang as Paris’s new man in Papeete. 
In the words of Sémir Al Wardi and Jean-Marc Regnault (2011, 118), 
“There has been no change [in attitude toward Tahiti] under Sarkozy, who 
simply replaced Flosse with Tong Sang.” As noted earlier, Estrosi, quickly 
nicknamed “Escrocsi” by some of his Tahitian critics as a wordplay on the 
term escroc (fraudster), rushed the controversial 2007 organic law reform 
for French Polynesia through the French parliament, a measure represent-
ing only a minority view (Tong Sang’s group) and explicitly opposed by 
a two-thirds majority (representing the Temaru-Flosse alliance) of the 
Assembly of French Polynesia.
During the campaign for the early elections of 2008 called for in the 
law, and more so between the two rounds of voting, Estrosi intervened 
even more directly into local politics. Immediately after the first election 
round, Estrosi, in the notorious “Girardin-style” described earlier, tele-
phoned Flosse as well as the leader of a minor party, Nicole Bouteau, and 
advised them to merge with Tong Sang’s ticket for the second ballot (TPM, 
Feb 2008). When Tong Sang’s party surprisingly won a relative major-
ity of seats in the assembly, the leadership of Sarkozy’s Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire (ump) party congratulated Estrosi for the “success-
ful carrying out of the election,” reinforcing the impression that he had 
interfered in the election process in Tong Sang’s favor. During the postelec-
tion negotiations, Estrosi once more attempted to interfere in the election 
process by calling on Flosse to become Tong Sang’s junior coalition part-
ner (DT, 11 Feb 2008). When these schemes failed and Flosse was elected 
president with Temaru as his junior partner, Sarkozy remained silent, and 
Estrosi refused to congratulate Flosse, merely “taking notice” of his presi-
dency (TP, 24 Feb 2008). In stark contrast, when two months later Flosse 
was overthrown and replaced by Tong Sang in a no-confidence motion 
after a few representatives had crossed the floor, President Sarkozy and 
other French government officials congratulated the new Polynesian presi-
dent immediately after his election (TPM, May 2008). A spokesperson for 
the ump party, of which Flosse has been a member for decades, announced 
the breaking off of all official contacts with Tahoeraa, which used to be 
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the ump’s local affiliate, accusing Flosse of betraying the ideals of the ump 
by forming an alliance “against nature” with Temaru (TP, 24 Feb 2008). 
On the other hand, Tong Sang was neither reprimanded nor ostracized 
from the ump when he temporarily allied himself with Temaru in April 
2009 (TPM, May 2009). Thus it appears that his alliance with Temaru 
was done on orders from Paris as part of another scheme to destroy the 
Temaru-Flosse alliance. 
In early 2010, Sarkozy himself revealed his colonialist attitude by 
declaring (during a speech on principles of French overseas territories pol-
icy given on Réunion Island in the Indian Ocean) that independence was 
an “impassable red line” for French overseas possessions. The statement 
caused great concern among pro-independence leaders, since it not only 
attested to a worrisome authoritarian attitude on the part of the president 
but also clearly contradicted the right of overseas territories to self-deter-
mination anchored in the preamble and article 53 of the French constitu-
tion (Government of France 1958; Al Wardi and Regnault 2011, 78–79).
Conclusion: The Just Cause of Self-determination  
under UN Oversight
An assessment of French policy in French Polynesia during the last half-
century is rather disheartening. In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the 
French government arbitrarily pulled the territory out of any available 
international or French domestic decolonization processes, subjecting it to 
an anachronistic restoration of colonial authority that included the arrest, 
sham trial, and long-term imprisonment of its major political leader and 
other unusually undemocratic measures. All this was done mainly in order 
to provide France with a location for nuclear weapons testing, which had 
tremendous environmental, health, and economic consequences during 
the following three decades. Worst of all, however, France to this day 
refuses to take responsibility for these acts of injustice and seek reconcili-
ation with the people who were traumatized by them. Misusing the con-
cept of autonomy in order to cover up a de facto continuity of colonial 
rule and, worse, to create a corrupt authoritarian government favorable 
to French interests during the 1990s and early 2000s has done nothing 
to resolve these grievances. To the contrary, it has added new ones to 
them. The recent actions and attitudes by French politicians like Brigitte 
Girardin, Christian Estrosi, and Nicolas Sarkozy toward French Polyne-
sia, arbitrarily modifying the rules of local politics and meddling therein 
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in order to keep or put their favorites in power, or simply attempting to 
declare independence “banned,” have further contributed to the impres-
sion that French Polynesia is still under colonial rule. In other words, 
yes, in a metaphorical sense, Angelo Neuffer’s 1999 song is correct, and 
France has indeed continued to behave “mai te hau Roma ra te huru.” 
However, as his song reminds us, not only are Caesar’s descendants still 
alive but also Herod’s. In every stage of French colonial policy, Tahitians 
have collaborated with the French colonial regime and thereby enabled 
the effectiveness of its policies on the ground.
For all these reasons, the campaign started by President Temaru to rein-
scribe French Polynesia as a nsgt has been a logical and reasonable under-
taking. As explored earlier in detail, the long absence of French Polynesia 
from that list represented a great anomaly, since virtually all other depen-
dent territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean (including most Euro-
pean Union–affiliated overseas countries and territories) have been listed 
therein.33 As Carlyle Corbin, an international law scholar who specializes 
in decolonization, commented, “This kind of premature removal of terri-
tories from the UN list is known well by advocates and scholars in Puerto 
Rico, by the . . . president of French Polynesia and by political leaders in 
other territories who have argued that their territories should be re-listed 
according to contemporary standards of international self-government” 
(2009, 4). The continuation of that anomaly represented, in addition to 
the memories of the Pouvanaa trial and the effects of nuclear testing, one 
of the manifestations of the unresolved colonial trauma. 
The hostile attitude of the French government to the campaign for rein-
scription— evidenced recently in the personal intervention made by French 
Foreign Minister Alain Juppé during the 2011 Pacific Forum meeting in 
order to lobby Pacific leaders into watering down the meeting’s resolu-
tion on the matter (TP, 6 Sept, 10 Sept 2011)—only serves to deepen the 
impression that France continues to behave as a colonizer. As for the local 
pro-French leaders, it is difficult to understand what they fear from the 
territory’s reinscription as a nsgt. A lone voice of reason in that sense was 
Representative Eléanor Parker, who, during the 18 August 2011 debate 
on the reinscription resolution in the Assembly of French Polynesia made 
a brilliant speech, identifying herself as an opponent of independence but 
arguing that only a decolonization process under UN oversight could 
guarantee a reasonable debate on the topic and a fair vote of self-deter-
mination, without fear of manipulation by the French government (TP, 18 
Aug 2011). The only rational motivation for those ferociously opposed to 
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reinscription might be the fact that almost all of them had been members 
and associates of the corrupt and authoritarian Flosse government before 
2004, and one could assume their concern about the country being too 
closely audited and examined by a neutral outside body such as the UN 
decolonization committee. 
As Jean-Marc Regnault has repeatedly remarked, this situation con-
trasts markedly with that of New Caledonia, reinscribed as a nsgt for 
more than twenty years, where today no one in the political spectrum 
objects to the territory’s decolonization, even though the pro-French par-
ties there want the process of decolonization to result in a status other 
than independence (Regnault 2011b). With the political system of that 
territory, deriving from the Noumea Accord, as an alternative concept 
of autonomy within the French system in view, Oscar Temaru and other 
pro-independence leaders of French Polynesia (including Flosse during his 
alliance with Temaru in 2007–2009) have thus for some time proposed to 
use the idea of the Noumea Accord as a model and have requested that a 
similar “Tahiti Nui Accord” be enacted for French Polynesia (TP, 24 June 
2005; TPM, April 2006; NT, 21 July 2007; Al Wardi and Regnault 2011, 
103). This would notably include an acknowledgment by the French gov-
ernment of the trauma caused by colonization as an important step toward 
reconciliation (Al Wardi 2008, 237). But like all other constructive sugges-
tions for a dialogue to decolonize the country, this idea has not found any 
resonance with the French government so far.
As related earlier, it must be underlined once more that decolonization 
means self-determination, not necessarily independence. Besides integra-
tion (which in the French case would mean départementalisation), the 
third option under the UN decolonization regime, free association, could 
offer some interesting new possibilities. Resolution 1541 (XV) of 1960 
defines free association as a “result of a free and voluntary choice of the 
peoples of the territory” and underlines that it should respect “the indi-
viduality and the cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples” 
(UN 1960b, annex, principle VII [a]). Most importantly, free associa-
tion must provide for the people of the territory the “freedom to modify 
the status of that territory through the expression of their will,” which 
implies the right of the territory to unilaterally end the relationship of 
free association with the metropolitan country and become fully inde-
pendent (Igarashi 2002, 242–246). Free association thus implies the right 
to sovereignty and is thereby clearly distinguished from any forms of ter-
ritorial autonomy in which the ruling state retains sovereignty. The Cook 
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Islands, neighboring and closely connected culturally and genealogically 
to French Polynesia, as a self-governing state in free association with its 
former colonial ruler New Zealand, might be an interesting model in 
that sense.34 According to Regnault (2007, 101–102), directly following 
the Cook Islands model would be impossible under the French consti-
tution, but once French Polynesia is independent, an association agree-
ment between the two countries could be possible (Government of France 
1958, article 88). On the other hand, if the constitutional articles relating 
to the Communauté Française, deleted in 1995 as related above, were 
restored, an arrangement of full self-government short of complete inde-
pendence that would indeed be quite similar to that of the Cook Islands 
might be possible as well. 
In any case, it is clear that presenting the current statute of autonomy 
with all its flaws as a form of decolonization constitutes nothing less 
than “intellectual fraud,” as Senator Tuheiava has stated recently (Mas-
sau 2011, 21). A sincere, unconstrained dialogue on a new institutional 
framework, including a revisiting of past injustices and the involvement of 
neutral international institutions such as the United Nations, is certainly 
overdue. This is warranted not only by the continuing injustices within 
French Polynesia; a rectification of the current anomalous political status 
of the territory through reinscription as a nsgt would also reinforce the 
validity and strength of the principles of international law and thereby 
contribute to the promotion of world peace, security, stability, and inter-
national cooperation. 
On 6 May 2012, François Hollande of the Socialist Party won the French 
presidential election and succeeded Nicolas Sarkozy in office. This change 
in power in Paris represents the possibility of great change in the relation 
between France and French Polynesia. For many years, the Socialist Party 
has had an official partnership agreement with Oscar Temaru’s Tavini 
Huiraatira party, and unlike the hostile attitudes shown by the right-wing 
leaders of the ump, the relationship between Temaru and Socialist leaders 
has been cordial in the recent past. The Socialist victory in France thus 
opens the possibility for a different attitude of France vis-à-vis Tahiti. In 
the past, French Socialist politicians have shown to be more willing to 
enter into constructive dialogue with colonized peoples, for instance, dur-
ing the civil war–like troubles in New Caledonia in the 1980s, followed 
by Michel Rocard’s initiative to conclude the 1988 Matignon Accord and 
Lionel Jospin’s engagement with the 1998 Noumea Accord. After all, it 
was also the Socialists who passed the extended statute of autonomy for 
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French Polynesia in 1984. On the other hand, however, one must also not 
forget that Socialist President François Mitterrand (in office 1981–1995), 
of all French presidents, was the one who ordered the largest number of 
nuclear tests and that it was the same Socialist government that perpe-
trated not only the assassination by snipers of Kanak leader Eloi Machoro 
in 1985 (Robie 1989, 116–126) but also the only documented case of 
state-sponsored terrorism by a Western, supposedly democratic, govern-
ment when French secret agents set up a bomb to sink the Greenpeace 
ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour the same year (Robie 1989, 
177–195). But with new generations of progressive political leaders ris-
ing, there is hope that these colonial crimes of the Socialists will one day 
be admitted and apologized for, just like those of de Gaulle. What Hol-
lande has already made clear is that he fully respects the stipulations of 
the Noumea Accord and recognizes the right of New Caledonia to self-
determination (Outre-Mer Première 2012). If by the end of this decade the 
Noumea process will indeed lead to either independence or a form of free 
association for that territory, it remains to be seen whether it will have a 
domino effect on French Polynesia.
* * *
I would like to thank ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????
Notes
1? ???????? ??????? ???????? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ?????-
graphic systems in use, Maohi is the Tahitian word for the native Polynesian peo-
ple. Since French Polynesia is obviously a colonial name, reminiscent of British 
West Africa, French Indochina, and the like, various proposals have been made 
for an indigenous name for the country, among them Tahiti Nui (Greater Tahiti); 
Fenua Maohi (Maohi Country); Te Ao Maohi (The Maohi World); and Maohi 
Nui (Greater Maohi), with the latter being currently favored by Oscar Temaru. 
Since none of the several phonetic spelling systems is currently universally recog-
nized, I here spell all Tahitian words without any diacritics.
2 Editor Alex du Prel of Tahiti Pacifique Magazine. Literally, du Prel decried 
President Oscar Temaru’s insistence on “inscription à l’ONU et autres incessantes 
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attaques paranoïaques contre l’Etat” and declared the loi-cadre to be a “loi vite 
abolie à Tahiti par le référendum de 1958” (TPM, Feb 2008, 5, 7). 
3 Neuffer 1999. Where the meaning of a Tahitian word or expression is 
ambiguous, the French translation provided in the CD liner notes has been used 
as a guideline. 
4 “La Polynésie ne se donna pas à la France, elle dût être conquise par les 
armes” (Toullelan 1991, 18).
5 All French laws and decrees cited are taken from Lechat 1990 unless other-
wise indicated. 
6 When Pouvanaa was finally allowed to return to the territory in 1968, he 
was a broken old man and no longer able to lead a strong political movement, 
even though he was highly revered and in 1971 was elected senator, a position he 
held until his death in 1977. See Regnault 1996, 205. 
7 The pamphlet stated, “La police est trop complaisante à leur égard. . . . Il 
faut les chasser ou les abattre [The police are too nice to them (Pouvanaa and his 
followers). . . . They need to be chased out or eliminated)].” Quoted in Regnault 
1996, 103, 179 and Saura 1997, 359.
8 Other local politicians, however, collaborated with the French  authorities, 
leading to a vote in the permanent committee of the territorial assembly to grant 
the French government title to the atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa free of charge 
in 1964 (Danielsson and Danielsson 1993, 127; Regnault 1996, 195).
9 Regnault, in collaboration with Catherine Vannier, recently published a 
definitive summary of all previous research on the Pouvanaa case in order to 
facilitate his judicial rehabilitation (Regnault and Vannier 2009).
10 “Il doit être bien entendu que la Polynésie française doit demander le statut 
de territoire d’outre-mer et non celui de membre de la Communauté” (quoted in 
Regnault 2003b, 21). See also Regnault 2006, 217.
11 Earlier, in 1982, followers of Pouvanaa had erected a monument in his 
honor in front of the Assembly building, where it still stands today (Saura 1997, 
441–443). Not replacing a French monument, and not directly criticizing French 
government policies, it appears to have been accepted more easily by the colonial 
administration than Temaru’s measures in 2006.
12 Contemporary observers Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff noted 
the political status of the French Pacific territories in the 1960s to be “not only 
anomalous but also anachronistic, in view of the rapidity with which many other 
Pacific islands with far smaller resources and European populations are moving 
towards autonomy” (1971, 4).
13 “Fidèle à sa mission traditionnelle, la France entend conduire les peuples dont 
elle a pris la charge à la liberté de s’administrer eux-mêmes et de gérer démocra-
tiquement leurs propres affaires; écartant tout système de colonisation fondé sur 
l’arbitraire, elle garantit à tous l’égal accès aux fonctions publiques et l’exercice 
individuel ou collectif des droits et libertés proclamés ou confirmés ci-dessus.”
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14 Saint-Pierre and Miquelon does not have any aboriginal population, its 
inhabitants being entirely of French metropolitan origin. The argument of a 
 non-applicability of article 73e thus makes sense in regard to this territory. As for 
the French Establishments in India, this latter territory was subsequently annexed 
by the Republic of India in the 1950s, thereafter ceasing to be a matter of French 
decolonization. Therefore, of the four French overseas territories removed in 
1947, the efo and New Caledonia cases should be of most concern here.
15 Before the recent campaign by President Temaru, measures to initiate a 
reinscription process for French Polynesia were taken by the Solomon Islands 
government in 1990 (Henningham 1992, 200) and by the Papua New Guinea 
government in 1996 (Maclellan and Chesnaux 1998, 247–248), both apparently 
with no follow-up. The reason for this apparent inconsistency in Pacific Islands 
foreign policy—giving full support to New Caledonia’s reinscription while with-
holding the same for French Polynesia—might be the absence of intercommunal 
violence and large-scale settler colonialism in Tahiti, both of which were and are 
present in New Caledonia (Mrgudovic 2008, 392–393).
16 The subsequent transfer of sovereignty to Guinea happened in a bitter 
breakup of all relations with France, whose officials committed acts of sabotage 
as a sort of revenge when they were leaving (Betts 1991, 125).
17 In the case of the Comoros, however, France has retained control to this 
day over one of the islands, Mayotte, while the Republic of the Comoros, sup-
ported by the African Union and the majority of UN member states, upholds its 
claim to the island and sees France’s control of Mayotte as a violation of Como-
rian sovereignty (Caminade 2003).
18 Renaud Meltz has pointed out the paradox that de Gaulle decolonized 
most of the French empire while reaffirming French imperialism in the Pacific 
(2010). 
19 For a discussion of the role of the Pacific territories in French geostrategic 
interests, see Aldrich 1993, 336, 352; Maclellan and Chesnaux 1998, 82–88.
20 See entries for the named territories on the World Statesmen website 
(http://worldstatesmen.org, accessed 27 April 2008), which show a period with 
elected local chief executives before independence for each of them. For an over-
view of the successful decolonization processes of Pacific Island territories, includ-
ing transitional periods of territorial autonomy, see also Naidu 1993. 
21 For a critical analysis of Gaston Flosse’s governance during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, see Regnault 2004, 97–119.
22 Compare, for instance, the headline “Un statut pour réussir” (A Statute 
for Success) in the pro-Flosse weekly Ti‘ama (27 Feb 2004) with the headline 
“Menaces sur la démocratie” (Threats to Democracy) in the opposition weekly 
To‘ere (18 Dec 2003). For a critical analysis of the 2004 statute, see also Regnault 
2007, 90–97.
23 For detailed descriptions and analyses of these repeated changes in govern-
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ment, see David Chappell’s and my own annual reviews of French Polynesia in 
The Contemporary Pacific (Chappell 2005; Gonschor 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012). 
24 L’accord de Noumea, 5 May 1998, reprinted in Faberon and Postic 2004, 
14–24.
25 Despite these provisions, New Caledonia has more recently experienced a 
high degree of executive instability as well (see Chappell 2012).
26 For the relevant legal texts and a brief comment on the New Caledonia 
case, see Faberon and Postic 2004. For a more extensive discussion of the Noumea 
Accord and its ramifications, see Chappell 1999. 
27 The British possessions of Bermuda and Gibraltar, for instance, both on the 
nsgt list, have autonomous territorial governments, responsible for almost all 
matters in Bermuda and all matters except foreign affairs, internal security, and 
defense in Gibraltar. See Government of Bermuda 2011 and Government of the 
United Kingdom 2006.
28 According to testimonies in the pro-independence weekly To‘ere (24 July 
2003), activists were subjected to torture-like abuses during arrests following vio-
lent protests against the resumption of nuclear testing in September 1995.
29 This quotation is from an rfo television report on 23 May 2004. rfo 
(Réseau France Outre-mer) is the former name of a network of television stations 
operating in French overseas departments and collectivities around the world. 
The network is now called Outre-mer Première.
30 In the original French: “Le processus électoral est loin d’être terminé.” 
31 For the details of these tumultuous events and the partisan attitude of the 
French government, see Regnault 2004, 121–174; Saura 2004; Guiselin 2005; 
and, from a pro-Flosse point of view, Haupert 2005.
32 In the original French: “pratiques coloniales en faveur d’un clan.” 
33 This anomaly became dramatically manifest in May 2010 when a French 
Polynesian delegation led by Oscar Temaru attempted to attend the annual 
Regional Seminar of the UN Decolonization Committee in Noumea, New Cale-
donia, at the invitation of Kanak independence leaders but was denied entry and 
physically removed from the scene by French police forces, on the grounds that 
French Polynesia is not on the list of nsgts (TPM, June 2010). 
34 For a discussion of the Cook Islands and other freely associated states in 
the Pacific (Niue, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and 
Palau), see Henderson 2002.
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Abstract
From a French perspective, French Polynesia is often described as an overseas 
territory that has been virtually decolonized through the granting of statutes of 
autonomy. In stark contrast, pro-independence local political parties still consider 
the country a colony and have successfully lobbied for a process of decoloniza-
tion under United Nations oversight. This article assesses these competing claims 
through an analysis of the political evolution of the territory since World War 
II. The analysis shows that French Polynesia has never been genuinely decolo-
nized. In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the French government arbitrarily pulled 
the territory out of all available international or French domestic decolonization 
processes, subjecting it to an anachronistic restoration of colonial authority that 
included the arrest and long-term imprisonment of its major political leader and 
a series of other unusually undemocratic measures. This led to, and culminated 
in, the construction of a nuclear testing facility, with tremendous environmental, 
health, and economic consequences during the following three decades. Later, 
after giving in to local protests demanding autonomy, France misused that con-
cept not only to cover up a de-facto continuity of colonial rule but also to create 
a corrupt authoritarian local government favorable to French interests. Recent 
actions taken and attitudes demonstrated by the French government and its repre-
sentatives, including repeated arbitrary modifications of the rules of local politics 
and meddling therein in order to secure their favorites in power, have shown that 
French colonialism in French Polynesia is alive and well. An international cam-
paign for the decolonization of the country is thus clearly warranted.
keywords: Tahiti, French Polynesia, colonialism, neocolonialism, autonomy, 
decolonization, self-determination.
